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The perestroika of academic labour: The 
neoliberal transformation of higher education 
and the resurrection of the ‘command economy’ 
Craig Brandist 
abstract 
This paper compares the changing function and organisation of higher education (HE) 
under neoliberal reforms, with particular focus on the UK, with those introduced by the 
Stalin regime in the 1930s and developed in the decades that followed. Although 
ideologically contrasting, many policies developed to subordinate HE and other state 
enterprises more directly to the accumulation of capital driven by competition are in 
many respects strikingly similar in each case. The historical development of each is 
examined, along with the political economy underlying them, highlighting the most 
important common features and differences. The proletarianisation of HE in the UK is 
shown to have encouraged the adoption of ‘spontaneous’ forms of resistance reminiscent 
of those workers adopted in the USSR to protect themselves from bureaucratic pressure. 
The paper suggests ways in which these forms of resistance might be incorporated into a 
more general struggle against the encroachment of neoliberalism. 
Introduction 
Once quite privileged professionals, university staff in the UK and elsewhere 
have undergone a dramatic process of proletarianisation over the last thirty years. 
This has resulted in stagnating and, recently, actually falling levels of pay, a huge 
growth in student numbers without corresponding increases in funding, and a 
massive increase in the number of precarious, hourly-paid lecturers. Professional 
autonomy has rapidly been eroded with the rise of a powerful and centralised 
institutional apparatus charged with imposing state-defined imperatives and 
subordinating academic to administrative priorities. Though supported by 
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rhetorical appeals to private enterprise and deregulation, the structure of higher 
education (HE) as it emerges from its neoliberal restructuring and reorientation 
(the Russian perestroika captures this conception) bears comparison in 
fundamental ways with the Soviet command economy in the Stalin period and 
after. Given that the USSR hardly stands as a beacon of academic freedom and 
intellectual integrity, there are good reasons to be concerned about this. The 
differences between the two systems and ideologies are, of course, numerous and 
obvious. To note just a few: education was considered a public good in the USSR 
and is treated mainly as a private good in the neoliberal UK; the neoliberal 
ideology of education as a market and the student as ‘customer’ finds no parallel 
in the USSR, and, of course, state repression is not something outspoken 
academics in the UK generally need to worry about. Nevertheless, as I have 
shown elsewhere (Brandist, 2014), the parallels are striking in a number of areas: 
the imperative for competition between institutions; the subordination of 
intellectual endeavor to extrinsic metrics; the lurching of departments and 
institutions from one target to another heedless of coherence; the need to couch 
research in terms of impact on the economy and social cohesion; the import of 
industrial performance management tactics; and the echoing of government 
slogans by funders (of which the Arts and Humanities Research Council’s 
invocation of the ‘Big Society’ some years ago is only the most crass example). 
These parallels are no less instructive than the differences. 
While consideration of these parallels helps to bring important contours of the 
current state of HE into sharper focus, and I make no claim to be the first person 
to notice many of them (see, for instance, Amann, 2003; Lorentz, 2012; Radice 
2008),
1
 a more substantial analysis requires us to look more deeply at what lies 
beneath these similarities. We must consider the political economy underlying 
the transformation of HE which gives rise to the formal continuities between the 
Stalinist and neoliberal regimes. We also need a historical analysis of the ways in 
which the Western and Soviet systems interacted and underwent 
transformations at the turn of the century. Here we build upon but move beyond 
the delineation of parallels and seek to identify their underlying, generative 
mechanisms. The current article thus seeks to advance our understanding of the 
nature and significance of the neoliberal transformation of HE, but also to 
suggest ways in which it might effectively be resisted. 
While the neoliberal transformation of HE has affected most, if not all, education 
systems in the world to some extent, the current article concentrates on HE in 
the UK, as a particularly acute case. It has proven so acute because a) successive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
  I was, however, unaware of these sources when writing my initial work on the 
subject.  
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governments since 1979 have been ideologically committed to the neoliberal 
transformation of the public sector as a whole; b) they have been able 
successfully to transmit their demands down the state’s vertical hierarchies 
(albeit in the face of considerable opposition);
2
 and c) the constitutional and 
structural position of central government in the UK has allowed it to carry out 
wide-ranging reforms right across the public sector in ways that have not been 
possible in federal states like Germany or the United States (Pollitt, 2011). The 
fact that the USSR and UK both displayed centralised constitutional 
arrangements allows the common features to emerge quite clearly, despite their 
seemingly contradictory ideological motivations. 
The neoliberal transformation of academic labour 
HE across much of the world has undergone a significant restructuring and 
reorientation over the last three decades. It is no longer a novelty to speak of the 
very idea of the university to be in crisis today as new, commercial imperatives 
impinge upon, but have yet been unable fully to supplant, continuities with a 
non-commercial past. As Ruth Barcan (2013) has persuasively argued, the 
university has acquired a ‘palimpsesitic’ character, with its original identity as a 
scholarly community being overlain first by a bureaucracy and more recently by a 
corporate-commercial institution, each with its own logic and demands. The 
mediaeval idea of a scholarly vocation, the pursuit and dissemination of 
knowledge, has been brought under a corporate form based on knowledge 
conceived as a commodity. Some disciplines have fared better than others in this 
new situation, but the maintenance of the ‘scholarly paradigm remains 
symbolically and economically central to the success of the corporation; it is a 
significant, indeed a key component of the university’s “brand value”’ (Barcan, 
2013: 88). A sharp intensification of labour has resulted from the competition 
that has been introduced into the system, converging with the underfunded 
expansion of HE, the proliferation of academic tasks through the addition of 
bureaucratic and corporate imperatives, the consequences of casualisation as well 
as the growth of knowledge itself (Barcan, 2013: 93).  
The notion of the ‘palimpsestic’ nature of the university today is helpful in 
understanding the dilemmas faced by university staff who remain committed to 
central aspects of the original scholarly ‘vocation’ that has been hijacked by the 
corporate form. It tends, however, to understate the essential contradictions that 
arise, such as the need for corporations to protect their ‘brand’ from prominent, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
  The Thatcher government’s defeat of the Miners’ Union in the great 1984-5 national 
strike was undoubtedly a key moment in weakening the workers’ movement to a 
point that it was able to implement such reforms. 
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but insubordinate academics with outspoken opinions, while at the same time 
respecting ‘academic freedom’.
3
 Direct censorship and state repression 
characteristic of the USSR in the Stalin years are fortunately not features of 
academic life in the bourgeois democracies, but a number of high profile cases 
have shown outspoken academics to be vulnerable to disciplinary action on 
precisely these grounds.
4
 It is in the very nature of the commercial pressures that 
have been brought into university life that it threatens to subordinate all trends 
and logics that obstruct its expansion. Emergent and residual factors are locked 
into a struggle that is both irresolvable and insurmountable without wider social 
transformation. The university ‘body’, which once sought to encapsulate 
Humboldtian ideals in an image of classical harmony and proportion, has now 
become an unstable, unintentionally grotesque phenomenon. Its ‘unseemly’ 
openness to economic nourishment becomes ever more obvious and exaggerated 
as institutions perform endless contortions to secure funds and to avoid 
complete dismemberment. Meanwhile, the requirement that academic staff 
become beings that can ‘embody’ the demands of each palimpsestic ‘layer’ has 
led to longer working hours, multitasking, increased levels of stress and a 
multitude of consequent pathologies. 
Increasing dislocation of staff from, and cynicism towards, such managerialism 
is evident throughout the system, but this does not directly undermine the 
effectiveness of the administration in directing researchers into what may be 
perceived as ‘safe’ projects likely to yield publications in the most prestigious 
journals. Indeed, this ‘cultural revolution’ spawns some new cadres who, 
motivated by career considerations, step forward as willing implementers of the 
new policy. The resulting conservatism extends beyond encouraging academics 
to restrict themselves to established patterns of research behavior, impinging on 
the ideological content of what is produced. In this Kuhnian world of ‘normal 
science’, the established paradigm remains unchallenged. As Frederic Lee (2007) 
has shown with reference to economics departments in the UK, requirements to 
succeed in the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE, now replaced by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
  Defined in the UK Education Reform Act 1988, Section 202 (2) as the need for 
University Commissioners ‘to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the 
law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and 
controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of 
losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions’. 
4
  The cases of the ‘insubordinate’ Professor Thomas Docherty at Warwick University, 
suspended for nine months for making ironic comments and projecting negative 
body language, Carole McCartney, reprimanded for ‘political tweeting’ at the 
University of Leeds and, most troubling of all, Steven Salaita at the University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign whose job offer was rescinded for sending assertive 
tweets about the Gaza conflict are but the most recent cases. 
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Research Excellence Framework, REF) compelled departments to maximise 
publications in neo-classical ‘diamond list’ journals. This led to a sharp decline in 
recruitment of ‘heterodox’ faculty and an ideological homogenisation of 
approach. 
There is an inescapable irony that the ideological basis of the reforms has been a 
commitment to privatisation of state assets and deregulation. While deregulation 
of the financial sector proceeded, with disastrous consequences largely 
unanticipated by neoclassical economists, this has been complemented by the 
hyper-regulation of the remaining state sector under the guise of what is now 
generally called ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1990). 
This is a strategy for reorienting existing state institutions, which were already 
geared towards serving the interests of capital in a general sense, according to the 
imperatives of neoliberalism. In NPM the managerial mode of evaluation 
colonises all spheres once regarded as at least semi-detached from the sphere of 
business, resulting in forms and practices that are distinctly reminiscent of the 
command economy established by the Stalin regime. This convergence of the 
running of British HE in particular, resulting from neo-liberal reforms, with 
central features of the now defunct Soviet central planning model would cheer 
the most unreformed Hegelian: apparent opposites interpenetrate, but are 
caught midway, unable to complete a transition.  
Of course one should never take ideological veneers at face value. Both the Soviet 
Party and the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (Hayek’s Mont Pèlerin Society and 
others) developed what Philip Mirowski (2013: 68) calls a ‘double truth doctrine’ 
according to which there is an ‘exoteric version of its doctrine for the masses’ and 
‘an esoteric doctrine for a small closed elite’, and that these are radically in 
contradiction with each other. Appropriately enough Mirowski calls the 
neoliberal version a ‘Russian doll’ (2013: 75) with multiple levels as, inter alia, 
warnings of expanding state activity conceal an advocacy of a strong state and 
portrayals of the market as something natural conceals a requirement for state 
intervention constantly to reconstruct it (2013: 69). Alexander Obolonsky 
similarly presents official Soviet ideology as having an ‘external layer’ that 
‘preached the doctrine of equality’, and an ‘internal layer’ that ‘condoned 
rampant privilege, nepotism, protectionism and caste discrimination’ (cited in 
Ryavec, 2003: 12). In each case it is the ‘internal layer’ that embodies its ‘true’ 
ideology and where correspondences are to be found. 
Parallels between the Soviet command economy and the managerialism of 
British HE has been the focus of at least two incisive studies (Amann, 2003; 
Radice, 2008; see also Lorentz, 2012; Radice, 2013), revealing the way in which 
the introduction of quasi-markets and an audit culture have replicated some 
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important patterns and pathologies of the Soviet model. The main factor is the 
control of HE institutions by the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) through mechanisms such as the RAE/REF, and the Quality Assurance 
Agency (QAA), along with the impending Teaching Excellence Framework 
(TEF). Targets that can be monitored through audits are imposed, while 
unquantifiable but crucial features like professional integrity and collegiality are 
undermined. As David Harvie has argued, the usurpation of the ‘use-value’ of 
research outputs by ‘RAE-value’ determined by ‘some notion of “socially 
necessary” research labour time’ (2000: 111) leads many people’s experience of 
research work increasingly to be a ‘chore imposed by others […] undertaken 
merely to satisfy needs external to the activity itself’ (2000: 114). The audit-values 
that increasingly determine what and how teaching should take place similarly 
erode the professional autonomy and intrinsic satisfaction of pedagogical work. 
Thatcherism and ‘New Labour’ 
University reform in the UK developed as part of the Thatcher government’s 
ideologically driven attempt to cut public spending by bringing quasi-markets 
into the public sector and making the distinction between purchasers and 
providers fundamental to the functioning of state enterprises. So how did it end 
up establishing a system resembling the twentieth century’s main attempt to 
repress all market forces? True enough the fact that quasi-markets replaced real 
markets and ‘organisational proxies’ replaced real customers in the new system 
was important (Amann, 2003: 292), for this replicated some of the reforms 
Soviet administrators introduced in the post-Stalin period to deal with the 
tendency towards stagnation that the Soviet economy experienced (Kähönen, 
2014). But this does not explain why this path was taken in the first place. At a 
relatively early stage of the reform process, in 1988, the conservative historian 
Elie Kedourie suggested that ‘why it should be thought right and necessary for 
universities to be submitted to a regime akin to that of a command economy is 
quite obscure’ (1988: 26). Some ideologues of laissez-faire economics raised 
critical voices at the very time the new system began to form, with some even 
pointing out parallels with the USSR command economy. The economist Deepak 
Lal argued that the government effectively nationalised universities as the only 
way to reconcile political pressures. Chief among them were the desires: 1) to 
control public expenditure on HE; 2) not to alienate the middle class benefiting 
from subsidised HE; 3) to maintain ‘parity of esteem’ among academics and 
Vice-Chancellors; and 4) to raise the proportion of school leavers entering HE 
(Lal, 1989: 5-6). The initial reforms did indeed balance these pressures, but they 
actually inaugurated a process whereby the inequity of various institutions has 
become ever more apparent. Lal recommended cutting universities free of state 
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control, abandoning the aim of maintaining a ‘parity of esteem’, introducing 
market-level fees, and providing state loans and some grants for students. 
Successive governments have only partially implemented this agenda, and for 
good reasons. 
The rhetorical claims of consumer choice in HE have largely been undermined 
by recent research. As Roger Brown in particular has shown, the comparative 
information universities are now compelled to provide in order to facilitate 
educated consumer choice between programmes is incoherent at best since 
programmes 1) have no comparable aims, structure, content, learning outcomes, 
delivery and support; 2) have no comparable assessment methods, criteria and 
outcomes (marks or grades); 3) have no way of ensuring assessment judgements 
are valid, reliable and consistent; and 4) students pursuing the programmes 
(and/or interested in pursuing the programmes) have no comparable starting 
attainments, aspirations, motivations, learning objectives, etc. (Brown, 2007; 
2011a). As Brown put it in his evidence to the UK parliament:  
There are simply too many variables and unknowns for meaningful comparative 
information of the kind found in a typical consumer market to be produced. Nor is 
there any evidence that students would be any more rational in using it than 
consumers of conventional goods or services. (Brown, 2011b) 
Unsurprisingly cynicism among academic staff in UK universities about the 
validity of quasi-market indicators remains at a high level.
5
 For example, the 
National Student Survey (NSS), essentially a customer satisfaction survey that 
final-year undergraduates are encouraged to complete, is widely regarded as, in 
the words of former director of research and evaluation at the Higher Education 
Academy Lee Harvey (2008), ‘shallow, costly, widely manipulated and 
methodologically worthless’, indeed ‘laughable’.
6
 
The Thatcher government may have been wedded to the rhetoric of ‘market 
sovereignty’, but ministers evidently had a firmer grasp of ‘really existing 
capitalism’ than many economists. British HE and the private sector were already 
entangled to a significant extent in the 1960s, as was most dramatically revealed 
with the publication of documents discovered during a student occupation at the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
  HEFCE has had to admit as much in its 2015 document ‘The metric tide’, which 
states: ‘There is considerable scepticism among researchers, universities, 
representative bodies and learned societies about the broader use of metrics in 
research assessment and management’. The report is online at 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/rereports/Year/2015/metrictide/Title,104463,en.html. 
6
  The National Union of Students’ July 2016 decision to boycott the NSS marks an 
important milestone in undermining its credibility. For information see 
http://www.nusconnect.org.uk/articles/motion-201-the-nss-boycott-or-sabotage. 
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University of Warwick in 1970 (Thompson, 2013 [1970]), but this intensified 
significantly with the removal of the ‘buffer’ between state policy and universities 
when the Universities Funding Council and then HEFCE replaced the University 
Grants Commission (UGC) in 1988 and 1992 respectively (Pratt, 1997: 10).
7
 The 
UCG ‘bridge and buffer’ had served to maintain the institutions necessary to 
integrate ‘the old aristocracy with the upper middle class of professionals needed 
to run a world empire’, i.e. Oxbridge, and develop new ones to ‘train the 
researchers and specialists required for a modern industrial capitalist economy, 
as well as the workforce of the expanding education system itself’ (Callinicos, 
2006: 24). Britain’s imperial decline undermined this function. In the 1960s 
new universities more closely connected to the expansion of private capital were 
established to help the UK maintain its position at the heart of the international 
capitalist system. Institutions now lobbied for funds within UGC, Westminster 
and the establishment’s London clubs.
8
 When capital shifted manufacturing 
abroad in search of cheaper and more compliant labour power, cutting back on 
vocational training, it was only universities that could provide the training needed 
to meet the anticipated demand for forms of skilled labour. The very existence of 
a buffer between policy and HE now became a ‘fetter’ on the further 
development of the productive forces. The intensification of competition between 
institutions in the UK led to a centralisation of power akin to Soviet-style ‘one-
man management’, as representative committees through which academic 
members of staff influenced policy and advanced their own professional 
principles have been neutered. Powerful vice-chancellors, with their executive-
level remuneration packages and supported by their executive boards, now drive 
measures to subordinate all practices to competition throughout the institutions 
they lead.  
What many early commentators failed to understand was that neoliberalism is 
not an ideology of laissez faire but of continual state intervention to fabricate the 
‘subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to making the 
fiction of markets real and consequential’ (Peck, 2010: 3). For all the talk about 
the sovereignty of markets, Thatcher’s ministers aimed for the subordination of 
HE to the accumulation of private capital as a major policy goal. One of the key 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
  Halsey (2012: 62-63) quotes the UGC’s own retrospective description of its role: ‘It 
relieved the government of assuming direct responsibility for the universities, and it 
safeguarded the universities from political interference. More positively, it was an 
earnest of the government’s willingness to provide money for the universities 
“without strings”, and it enabled the universities to enjoy public funds without the 
fear that the gift might turn out to be a Greek one […] The Treasury was deeply 
committed to the “buffer” principle, and guarded most jealously the Committee’s 
independent status’. 
8
  I am indebted to Hugo Radice, personal communication, for this point. 
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functions the state plays for capital is to ensure a plentiful supply of ‘free’ labour 
with sufficient skills. The skills needed by the service industries that were 
expected to replace manufacturing were difficult to anticipate in detail, and it was 
unclear how the grounds would be prepared without a reorientation of HE. 
Thatcher’s Education Secretary, Kenneth Baker undoubtedly had this in mind 
when he argued that ‘above all there is an urgent need, in the interests of the 
nation as a whole […] for higher education to take increasing account of the 
economic requirements of the country’ (quoted in Lal, 1989: 8). It was the state 
that had to try to anticipate the types of labour power that would be required, and 
UK universities had nothing like the buoyant endowments that enabled private 
universities in the United States to take on some of this role as well as to 
reproduce a coherent dominant class.  
The Blair-Brown Labour government that followed in May 1997 intensified and 
systematised the same policy, with ex-Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 
ideologues playing a role in giving the policy coherence. Marxism Today, the 
journal of the Eurocommunist wing of the CPGB, was important here, 
promoting a left-sounding rationale for New Labour’s embrace of the neoliberal 
agenda (Pimlott, 2004; 2005). One former Marxism Today writer, Charles 
Leadbeater, who became one of Tony Blair’s advisors, went as far as to argue that 
[u]niversities should become not just centres of teaching and research but hubs for 
innovation networks in local economies, helping to spin off companies for 
universities, for example. Universities should become the open-cast mines of the 
knowledge economy. (Leadbeater, 1999: 114) 
Education secretary Charles Clarke correspondingly set one of his main goals in 
2003 to be ‘better progress in harnessing knowledge to wealth creation’ (Clarke, 
2003: 2). It was indeed with the Blair-Brown government that the ideologies of 
the market and command economies found their tightest embrace. In June 2007 
governmental responsibility for universities was removed from the department 
responsible for general education, with the formation of the Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills (from 2009, The Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills). Its strategic objectives explicitly specified the pursuit of 
research and teaching ‘in line with employer demand’ and ‘sustaining economic 
competitiveness’.
9
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
  The National Archive: 
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.dius.gov.uk/about_DIU
S/what_we_do/objectives/. 
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Soviet HE 
As in the UK, Soviet HE expanded considerably in the post-World War 2 era to 
provide the educated workforce needed to drive the unprecedented economic 
expansion which, to a significant extent, was driven by the state spending on 
armaments during the Cold War. Needing to substitute imports in all areas of 
the economy and to maintain a military apparatus much larger than that typical 
of a middle-sized economy, the USSR developed a disproportionally large HE 
sector. The humanities did relatively well in such conditions since foreign 
language skills had a number of direct applications and the arts were 
fundamental to the cultural dimension of the struggle for hegemony.
10
 The 
autonomy of relatively inexpensive areas of research from direct bureaucratic 
control, i.e. academic freedom, was one aspect of this ideological struggle in the 
West, yielding benefits in detection of and finding administrative solutions to the 
most acute social problems in conditions where living standards were rising and 
the welfare state was relatively well funded. The more directly repressive USSR 
had much less scope for such activities, so researchers in the humanities were 
rewarded for providing ‘scientific ideologies’ in support of their rulers, or 
retreated into a formalism where they said little essential or did so in such a way 
that it was accessible only to the initiated.
11
 The scholasticism of Soviet 
philosophy and social science became notorious by the 1960s (Blakeley, 1961), 
though important achievements were nevertheless forthcoming. 
The much narrower space for critical research in the USSR did not simply 
express the authoritarian proclivities of policymakers, but the institutional 
dynamics that resulted from external pressure. Surrounded by hostile powers 
with a much greater capacity for belligerence, Stalin launched the USSR on an 
irreversible path towards the complete subjugation of economic development to 
military competition with the First Five Year Plan of 1929-32. With private 
enterprise already subordinated to the state as a result of revolution and civil war 
(what Lenin termed ‘state capitalism’), the institutions of the state were now 
reorganised to serve the process of capital accumulation, rationalising working 
practices through the ‘scientific organisation of labour’ (NOT), and tightening up 
management through so-called ‘institutions of agitation’ (Beissinger, 1988; 
Zhukova, 1990). Schools that had been pioneers in the progressive teaching 
methods advocated by John Dewey and others underwent a dramatic 
‘instrumentalisation’, with a return to traditional methods of instruction.
12
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
  On the importance of the cultural dimension of this struggle in the USSR in Stalin’s 
time, see Clark (2011).  
11
  On the principles being invoked here see Bourdieu (1975). 
12
  On shifts in Soviet school policy and practice see, especially, Holmes (1991). 
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Universities faced existential threats during the turmoil of the 1929-32 transition, 
but what emerged was a ‘palimpsestic’ formation in which the prestigious 
institutions established by the bureaucracy of the Tsarist absolutist state were 
overlain by the requirement to be linked to raising production, which was 
enforced by ‘one-man management’ (see David-Fox, 2000). Natural science and 
engineering was geared towards the development of means of production and 
destruction (the military), the social sciences towards the most effective 
mobilisation of the labour power of the population, and the humanities towards 
techniques of persuasion and ideological consolidation at home and abroad. 
The great purges of the late 1930s, which centred on repression of the Bolshevik 
‘old guard’ and national Communists, also had serious ramifications for many 
intellectuals in HE institutions in the USSR. It should be noted, however, that 
apart from the repression of intellectuals specifically associated with the political 
opposition, the targets of the purges were poorly defined. Stalin’s exhortations to 
‘purge the Party and the economic organisations of unreliable, unstable and 
degenerate elements’ (Stalin, 1972 [1934]: 376) had more direct effects on the 
administration than faculty, even if it encouraged denunciations driven by 
localised institutional politics. Systematic repression of advocates of specific 
theories within academia was rare, especially in areas relatively detached from 
administrative practice. In the humanities, for instance, a similar number of 
vocal supporters of the officially-supported (between 1932 and 1950) ‘Marrist’ 
current in linguistics perished as their opponents, while even the most 
outspoken representatives of the defeated Russian Formalist school of literary 
criticism survived and continued to work, while many of the supposedly 
victorious Marxist critics perished.
13
 It was the humanities that generally proved 
the most difficult to manage by their very nature, and a certain plurality of 
perspectives was required to keep the system alive, but this needed constantly to 
be policed to prevent the emergence of coherent, oppositional currents. 
After Stalin’s death there was a significant loosening of restrictions within 
institutions as economic growth outstripped that of the West, but enduring Cold 
War pressures and restive satellite states in Eastern Europe imposed limits on 
any scope for dissent. As economic contradictions became more acute in the 
1970s, Cold War pressures intensified at the end of that decade, and some 
dissident intellectuals chafed against the constraints of the system, repression 
became more visible once more. Finally the USSR was forced to yield its position 
in the hierarchy of states and the reform era began. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
 ‘Marrism’ pertains to linguistic ideas centred on the ideas of Nikolai Marr (see 
Brandist, 2015: 193-220). 
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The cases of a few high-profile, dissident intellectuals led to a general impression 
that it was formal censorship and state repression that was the fundamental 
method through which ideological conformity was maintained in Soviet HE. This 
was not the case, especially after Stalin’s death in 1953. The occasional and very 
visible intervention by state censors only served to set markers and deal with 
failures in more routine forms of regulation.
14
 The institutional structures that 
channeled competition for resources, reputation and professional advancement 
in ways serving the imperative of capital accumulation and so the perpetuation of 
the power structure were generally sufficient to orient intellectual labour. An 
elaborate apparatus distributed resources according to such criteria as the 
‘linking’ or ‘coordination of scholarship and society’ (uviazka nauki i obshchestva), 
which needed to be demonstrated in applications and justified in periodic reports 
to funding bodies (see, for instance, Fortescue, 1990: passim; Josephson, 1997: 
277ff). Research teams and institutions competed with each other according to 
elaborate metrics, with information flowing upwards, from kafedra (department) 
through faculty to the education ministries and targets descending from the 
administration and ultimately the state by the same route. Periodic inspections 
enforced coherence and conformity, imposing strict limits on professional 
autonomy, while special funds encouraged the development of research areas 
held to be topical. Such mechanisms were merely the way in which the general 
dynamic of the command economy manifested itself in HE. 
Accumulation, competition and centralisation 
It is, however, the more general internal structures and practices of the Soviet 
command economy rather than the specific features of Soviet HE that find 
echoes in the new managerialism of neoliberal HE. As Hugo Radice (2008: 117) 
notes, an understanding of this requires that the question is placed in its ‘broader 
social context’, meaning the complex relationship between the Soviet system and 
‘capitalism, as both origin and adversary’, and in the ‘growing imbrication’ of 
British HE ‘with the private sector’. It may well be, however, that we are not 
dealing with mere analogy and resemblance but with a more fundamental 
adoption of Soviet-style practices and organisational forms by the neoliberal state.  
NPM is the form in which the neoliberal reorientation of state institutions more 
directly to support the competitiveness of capitals within its orbit embeds the 
logic of competition throughout those institutions. Though having important 
intellectual roots in Public Choice Theory and the new Institutional Economics 
that developed in US business schools (Gruening, 2001; Peters, 2013), influence 
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 On similar developments in Soviet mass media, see Sparks and Reading (1998). 
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has flowed in two directions. NPM maintains important connections with 
Scientific Management, the various systems of factory organisation that had 
developed from the system of Frederick Winslow Taylor. Taylorism ‘shifted 
effective control from the shop floor to management’, engineering the entire 
work process from beginning to end (Rabinbach, 1990: 239). More specifically, it 
sought the most efficient method of fulfilling all tasks on the shop floor by 
dividing them into ‘replicable units’, while ‘linking wages to productivity through 
“time and motion” studies, keyed to the speed and output of the individual 
worker’ (Rabinbach, 1990: 239). Moving from the factory to the entire 
administrative process required considerable modifications to the Taylorist 
system, which Soviet administrators were in the forefront of institutionalising 
and developing in the 1920s, when industrial psychology, psychotechnics, and 
the training of both managers and shop-floor workers had been incorporated. As 
Beissinger (1988: 84) notes, ‘[i]n their scope and reach, Soviet attempts in the 
1920s to infuse administration with the principles and methods of Scientific 
Management far surpassed any of the concurrent efforts directed by Western 
governments’. At the end of that decade both manager and worker resistance to 
rationalisation was very considerable and results of rationalisation were in many 
cases marginal. Stalin’s ‘great break’ of 1928-32 involved arrests of prominent 
specialists in the production process for sabotage and wrecking and a sharp 
increase use of coercion in the productive process. The result was a well-known 
vicious circle in which planners set challenging targets, managers hoarded 
supplies and capacity to be able to respond to further increased targets, workers 
worked slowly to be able to accelerate when faced with those targets and planners 
responding by increasing targets.  
More sophisticated techniques saw a sharp resurgence under Khrushchev’s 
perestroika, with the introduction of notions of profit into accounting and the 
proliferation of market analogues. It was at this time that a number of 
economists, including Galbraith (1967), hypothesised the convergence of Soviet 
and Western economies on the basis of industrial development and the 
emergence of the new forms of pricing and planning in the USSR.
15
 The extent 
of any convergence was, however, severely limited because of the USSR’s 
capacity to obstruct the globalising trends of western capital. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between the Soviet system and capitalism resulted in the 
internalisation of the main dynamic of latter by the former, though it manifested 
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  The trend was arguably begun by the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen (1961), but 
became quite widespread, even finding an echo in the work of the Frankfurt School 
philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1964). Marcuse’s work on ‘one-dimensional’ language 
and thought seems rather more suited to neoliberalism than the corporate forms it 
was designed to analyse. See also Gouré et al. (1973). 
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itself in a specific way. The state bureaucracy, like the management of a large 
corporation, became the institutional personification of capital, accumulating for 
the sake of accumulation in order to withstand the pressures of competition. The 
fact that the form the competition took was primarily military did not alter the 
fundamental principle that was in operation since the proportion of the economy 
dedicated to military production was so much greater than in the West. The same 
competitive logic was passed down through the entire system in the name of 
‘socialist competition’ (sotsialisticheskoe sorevnevanie), which Isaac Deutscher 
(1952: 387) aptly labeled ‘bourgeois competition’ with ‘ideological 
embellishments’. The very logic of this struggle led to the centralisation of 
control, ‘one-man management’ that allowed often unpopular but ‘necessary’ 
policies, e.g. to raise productivity or close uncompetitive units of production, to 
be imposed throughout each enterprise without recourse to negotiation.  
Despite their opposing starting points as far as the modality of relations between 
state and economy is concerned, the Stalinist and neo-liberal projects share 
something more fundamental: both projects aim at the complete subordination 
of all social institutions to the accumulation of capital. This is reflected in highly 
utopian political programmes based on the myth that managers could harmonise 
economy and society or, more accurately, engineer social institutions to serve a 
reified, economic idol.
16
 The drive to accumulate capital is, in the Soviet and 
Western capitalist cases, imposed by the logic of competition – in varying 
proportions commercial, military and geostrategic. Fundamentally, capital 
accumulation is in both cases secured through the exploitation of labour power. 
It was, moreover, this common ground that allowed the transfer from post-
Stalinist modes of de facto collective-bureaucratic ‘ownership’ and control to 
private, openly capitalist, modes of ownership and control to take place as the 
Soviet Union approached disintegration, without any revolutionary 
transformation. Already in the early 1970s groups of neoliberal intellectuals were 
working in academic think-tanks in the USSR under the protection of powerful 
apparatchiki like Iurii Andropov (Flaherty, 1991: 129), but it was not until the 
post-Stalinist system began to collapse that they were able to exert a significant 
influence. De facto privatisation took place under Gorbachev, and de jure 
privatisation under Yeltsin, with directors of nationalised enterprises becoming 
directors of privatised enterprises. As Bukharin and Preobrazhensky (1969 
[1919]: 163) had put it, discussing nationalisation of industry during the 1914-18 
war, ‘the capitalists simply transferred their possessions from one pocket to 
another; the possessions remained as large as ever’. 
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  Common invocations of the ‘health’ or ‘needs’ of the economy in isolation from, or 
even in contradistinction to, how well or poorly the majority of the population 
actually live, are clear examples of this ideological formation. 
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Thus, when western neo-conservatives met with East-European advocates of 
‘market socialism’ in such fora as the Centre for the Study of Economic and 
Social Problems (CESES) in Milan (Bockman, 2007; 2011) they shared more than 
a belief in neo-classical economics. ‘Market socialists’ hoped to gear the state 
towards maximising competition between enterprises and guarding against the 
emergence of monopolies. While critical of the Soviet command system, and 
keen for economies to be free of its military demands, they failed to understand 
that any state integrated into the world economy has to assist its capitals in 
competition with foreign capitals, backed by foreign states, in the last instance 
militarily. They took the Soviet state’s protection of enterprises against the 
pressures of international capital for granted. Once it had gone foreign capital, 
backed by their own states, overwhelmed the relatively weak enterprises of the 
Soviet bloc. Yet another crucial factor was in play: increased competition from 
rising Asian economies placed key sectors of the Western economy in a 
precarious position. Faced with this, US and European capitals required their 
states prioritise supporting their competitiveness rather than intervening to 
dampen business cycles and support full employment. This involved the 
inculcation of competitive behavior throughout the state and society in general 
and its presentation as natural. Crucial here was what Judith Merkle (1980: 262) 
calls ‘the continual exchange of organisational techniques within […] a common 
industrial – not political – culture; this international system of rational-technical 
organisation rested the foundations laid by the old international Scientific 
Management movement’. As Western consultants flooded into the former 
Eastern Bloc to advise on ways to dismantle obstacles to international capital and 
to pursue privatisation, they acquired greater awareness of the practices 
characteristic of post-Stalinist state institutions to promote and support the 
competitiveness of capitals based within its jurisdiction. NPM was the synthesis.  
Resistance in the Soviet workplace 
Fortunately this account of shifts in governmental policy and managerial practice 
is only part of the story. While the Soviet economy clearly achieved impressive 
results (the space programme and parity of nuclear weapons with the USA by 
1970 perhaps the most symbolic), the bureaucratic system had a range of 
pathologies and generated patterns of resistance that ultimately undermined its 
effectiveness.
17
 The Soviet workplace was not a harmonious environment. Not 
only were workers separated from all decision-making in workplaces, atomised 
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  For an interesting account of the ways in which repressive aspects of Taylorism 
reached their apogee in Stalin’s Russia, while interacting with indigenous practices 
see Merkle (1980: 121-135). 
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by the widespread implementation of performance-related pay (piece-rates) and 
subjected to continual pressures to raise productivity, but this was justified in 
rhetoric that maintained the outward forms of the long-defeated revolutionary 
movement. The pressures of capital accumulation led to an experience of the 
workplace as an exploitative environment where appeals to the rhetorical shadow 
of residual ‘socialist’ forms were regarded with cynicism. Constant attempts to 
intensify the productivity of labour power failed in the last instance because 
despite their atomisation and incapacity to organise collectively for more than 
sporadic struggles, workers resisted intensification by asserting ‘negative 
sanctions directly at the point of production’ (Filtzer, 1996: 24). Problems that 
arose out of the bureaucracy’s incapacity accurately to process data from millions 
of transactions were rendered chronic by the fact that workers experienced a 
profound level of alienation from the system, refused actively to participate in 
problem-solving, and instead took advantage of the slippages in the system to 
relieve pressure on themselves and their colleagues.  
Attempts by senior managers to increase pressure by raising targets and 
tightening up the system proved ineffective because they increased alienation 
and encouraged the development of new tactics to absorb pressure from above. 
As Tony Cliff commented as early as 1955, the drive to raise the productivity of 
labour, to ‘rationalise’ and ‘accentuate’ exploitation, created its own impediment 
to raising productivity:  
By the effort to convert the worker into a cog of the bureaucrat’s productive 
machine, they kill in him what they most need, productivity and creative 
ability…The more skilled and integrated the working class the more will it resist 
alienation and exploitation, but also show contempt for its exploiters and 
oppressors. The workers have lost respect for the bureaucracy as technical 
administrators. No ruling class can continue for long to maintain itself in the face 
of popular contempt. (Cliff, 1970 [1955]: 309-310) 
The creativity and ingenuity of millions of workers that were needed to make the 
system work were instead diverted into negative forms of individualised 
resistance that opened space for indolence and, often, drunkenness. All this is 
quite familiar to anyone who worked in mass production industries during times 
of full employment, and was certainly not unique to the Soviet case (see, for 
instance, Hamper, 1992). Indeed, the histories of individual corporations like 
Ford, General Motors or IBM exhibit fundamentally the same practices and 
tendency toward stagnation, including phases of dictatorial expansion, limited 
pluralism, stagnation and restructuring that characterised the history of the 
USSR from the end of the 1920s (Halbertstam, 1986; Harman, 1989; Wilhelm, 
1985; Wright, 1979). 
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Common patterns of resistance 
Soviet bureaucrats proved ever less capable of appropriating what Marx called the 
‘general intellect’, that is ‘the faculty of language, the disposition to learn, 
memory, the capacity to abstract, and the inclinations towards self-reflexivity’ 
(Virno, 2007: 6).
18
 Indeed, these capacities were often employed to resist 
bureaucratic pressures and in ways detrimental to the productive process itself. 
Although many tactics adopted by workers were not theorised in the strict sense, 
they nevertheless achieved a form of articulation with the development of 
workplace jargon or even argot. These became a kind of shadow vocabulary to the 
widely derided language of Soviet managerialism, and which has found distinct 
echoes in the parasitic, ‘bullshit’ language of neoliberalism (Lorentz, 2012). It 
was quite common for petty managers to adopt the same conceptions as ways of 
developing a buffer between their superiors and subordinates. This led some 
commentators to claim an unusual level of collusion between Soviet managers 
and workers, but the very category of ‘manager’ is one that obscures much more 
than it reveals, and often deliberately so.  
The proliferation of job titles bearing the word ‘manager’ and the re-description 
of routine administrative tasks as ‘management’ is so common in today’s 
universities that it often passes without comment. This attempt to present 
everyday work as having managerial function is reinforced by training courses 
that constantly propagandise the idea that there is no real division between 
managers and other staff within the institution. We are, it seems, ‘all managers’, 
however minimal supervisory roles may actually be, or else senior decision-
makers are simply ‘all employees’. At the same time academics are expected to 
act as entrepreneurs, seeking out opportunities for funding and 
commercialisation. Disingenuous appeals to the image of a long-vanished 
collegiality, in which university staff exerted an unusual amount of control over 
their activities, are very much akin to the dominant Soviet ideology of the 
‘comradely’ practices of the ‘socialist’ economy. In each case the structures of 
power over resources and people are deliberately obscured, even though they 
remain very real and actively experienced. There is a palpable and growing sense 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in universities, especially resulting from spiraling vice-
chancellor remuneration, falling staff salaries and pensions, increasing 
workloads, and the imposition of bureaucratic imperatives that are often 
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  Tony Smith (2013) provides a penetrating critique of Paolo Virno and Carlo 
Vercellone’s development of Marx’s theory of capital into an analysis of post-fordism, 
noting that ‘any and all variants of capital rest on a “depository of cognitive 
competences that cannot be objectified”, that is, on the general intellect with 
“operational materiality” insofar as it “organizes the production process and the ‘life-
world’”’ (ibid.: 248). 
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antithetical to professional values. This proletarianisation has encouraged 
cynicism towards self-interested invocations of ‘collegiality’, and hostility among 
most staff towards the university management and government agencies. This is 
reflected in the transformation of the Association of University Teachers, an 
organisation that was caught midway between viewing itself as a trade union and 
professional association, into the University and College Union, unambiguously 
a trade union, which incorporates both Further and Higher Education staff.  
While the union makes a real difference to everyday practices within institutions, 
recent campaigns over pay and pensions (deferred pay) have been miserable 
failures, to a considerable extent due to very poor national leadership, but also 
because the union has faced tightening legal constraints on its ability to take 
collective action that is effective. Action short of a strike, in the form of an 
assessment boycott, may now attract the complete withdrawal of salary, while 
strike action needs to be protracted in order to put any significant pressure on 
employers. Currently unable to challenge and overcome these limitations, the 
organisation has entered a period of retrenchment and the defense of past gains 
through attrition. Employee discontent and resentment, along with cynicism 
towards managerial metrics and imperatives are never far beneath the surface, 
but confidence to take collective action is low. The constraints on Soviet workers 
were considerably more severe than in the UK, but discontent nevertheless found 
expression through forms of informal resistance ranging from negative varieties 
of individual resistance (absences, unproductive working, sabotage) to forms of 
collusion, conspiracy and reciprocal support among those who fundamentally 
shared a position of alienation from the control of resources. Some of these 
forms are remarkably familiar to those operating in HE today. 
In his 2003 article, Amann provocatively outlined parallels between the way in 
which practices then developing in British HE resembled those of Soviet 
administrators and workers alike, who ‘became masters of prioritisation and 
learned to absorb huge amounts of administrative pressure’, developing 
‘essential survival skills’ that rendered the bureaucratic direction of the command 
economy ineffective (2003: 471). In the last decade collegiality has even further 
given way to instrumental behaviour, and alienation from the demands of 
‘corporate identity’ has become ubiquitous. Senior managers strive to create an 
image of central omnipotence, intervening to ensure the fulfillment of targets 
(podmena) (Fortescue, 1983: 179), issuing internal communications that all is well 
with the institution (vranʹ e), while issuing guidelines and ‘key performance 
indicators’ to motivate staff (melochnaia opeika, micromanagement). Members of 
staff respond by ingratiating themselves with their superiors (blatʹ ), and cover for 
each other in order to defend themselves from scrutiny (krugovaia porukha, esprit 
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de corps).
19
 Individual staff evaluations, reports to funding bodies, departmental 
or team reports are routinely padded with superfluous detail to illustrate 
objectives have been ‘met’ and plans have been ‘fulfilled’ (pripiska), dazzling the 
reader with superficial show (pokazukha) in order to distract attention from 
failures (ochkovtiratelʹ stvo, literally eye-wiping, perhaps best rendered as eyewash, 
camouflage). Seeking to defend their own patch (mestnichestvo, vedomstvennostʹ ), 
petty managers collude with other staff, tactically shifting between shows of 
deference, bluff and deception (bumazhnoe tvorchestvo, literally ‘paper creation’), 
though they may, instead, choose to pass on the pressures from above and bully 
their subordinates. Senior managers respond by issuing polemics against 
tendencies that cannot successfully be coerced and issue more targets and 
pressures that perpetuate the cycle.
20
 The whole process begins to resemble what 
Antonio Gramsci (1971: 149) was to call ‘a game of blind man’s buff’, by which 
oppositional tendencies that cannot be coerced joust with agents of a ruling 
apparatus that cannot be overcome. 
It would be tempting to designate these behavior patterns as ‘spontaneous’, 
though as Gramsci argued, ‘pure spontaneity’ is a myth. These practices are 
learned and passed on, so ‘spontaneity’ can at most signify that ‘the [perhaps 
rudimentary] elements of “conscious leadership” cannot be checked, have left no 
conscious document’ (Gramsci, 1971: 196). Moreover, in the USSR at least, they 
achieved a degree of self-reflexiveness, which then became embedded in popular 
culture through urban folklore (anecdotes and the like) and satire. The level of 
conceptualisation, and the extent to which it spread, suggests these forms of 
struggle developed beyond what Gramsci termed an ‘immanent’ or ‘spontaneous 
grammar’ to acquire a ‘normative’ status, a grammatical conformity ‘made up of 
reciprocal monitoring, reciprocal teaching […] and in mimicry and teasing’ 
(Gramsci, 1985: 180).
21
 The repressive conditions of Stalinist and post-Stalinist 
regimes made it very difficult to develop this ‘normative grammar’ into a 
systematic account of one’s place within the institutional structure and within 
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  On the history of the term krugovaia porukha, see Rowney (2009: 32). 
20
  Other pathologies of bureaucracy identified by Russian analysts include formalistic 
answers (otpiski), the turning of norms and rules into goals in themselves (samotsel’), 
pedantic execution of directives, humoring superiors, localism, departmentalism, 
‘over-insuring’, passing the buck (Ryavec, 1996: 73-4; 2003: 97). 
21
  One cartoon by Mikhail Cheremnykh in the popular Soviet satirical magazine 
Krokodil from 1953 shows the vocabulary of the game of ‘blind man’s buff’ was well 
established by the time of Stalin’s death. It shows a group of four petty managers 
drawing up a report and one asking: ‘Wouldn’t it be too little if we write in [pripisat’] 
the report that we have only fulfilled the plan by 20%?’ To which another answers 
‘It’s sufficient, but they’ll think it is a clear case of eyewash [ochkovtiratel’stvo]’. Online 
at http://second-person.livejournal.com/13656.html. 
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society as a whole. ‘Organic intellectuals’ remained atomised and the formation 
of independent organisation occasional and sporadic at best. 
Here we can begin to see some of the practical implications of our study. The 
emergence of forms of struggle akin to those of Soviet workers and petty 
managers among UK university staff, and other areas of the public sector 
dominated by NPM, signifies the emergence of an incipient class-consciousness 
arising directly from the ongoing process of proletarianisation. While organising 
academics may still resemble herding cats, a greater consistency of orientation 
now emerges among the growing ranks of staff whose professional autonomy 
and access to resources is very narrow indeed. Significant obstacles to effective 
organisation and collective action remain, but they are on a scale nowhere near 
those that faced Soviet workers. In such circumstances it may well prove fruitful 
to supplement traditional forms of trades union organisation with attempts to 
structure and systematise the patterns of resistance emerging within institutions 
that imply a critique of neoliberal imperatives in HE. Their pursuit obstructs 
NPM while opening a space not simply for indolence but for the very 
autonomous professional activities NPM squeezes out. This may highlight and 
take advantage of the ‘palimpsestic’ nature of HE today, reconnecting with the 
sense of vocation many who work in HE retain despite the commodification of 
teaching and research. In order to make the connection most effective means 
simultaneously to pursue a relentless ideology-critique of NPM while articulating 
an alternative vision of HE based on those aspects of the university ‘palimpsest’ 
that are irreducible to corporate imperatives, while spurning all elitism. In short 
it means to provide intellectual leadership as well as to pursue bread-and-butter 
issues, indeed to bind them together, just as neoliberalism and NPM are bound 
together. 
Conclusion 
One reason the parallels between the (post-)Stalinist and neoliberal projects 
become particularly clear in the case of the latter’s perestroika of HE is that both 
projects had important educational dimensions. In each case homo politicus is to 
be reduced to the ultimately manipulable homo econonomicus who accepts their 
ignorance and defers to the central bureaucratic apparatus or the market as 
supreme ‘information processor’ (Mirowski, 2013: 54-55). Those who sell their 
labour power must be taught to understand that the question of power (vopros o 
vlasti) is settled, the ‘end of history’ has arrived. For most, at least, education 
should now yield to the creation of subjectivities who constantly yield to the 
imperatives of capital, they must seek training to serve the indefinite expansion 
of value, and they must pay for the privilege. In reality, though, these are severely 
Craig Brandist The perestroika of academic labour 
article | 603 
malfunctioning systems that are redolent with contradictions and pathologies. 
Analysis and critique of these problems, as well as engagement in the ideological 
struggles over the future of HE and its place in society more generally are 
indispensible. They are only part of a larger process, however. Successful 
resistance requires an understanding of the forms of oppositional activity 
generated by the system itself and their coordination into a unified strategy with 
agreed aims and objectives. In other words, it requires a democratic, oppositional 
educational programme that makes explicit and structures the incipient and 
sporadic conception of the world that is embedded in the very process of resisting 
the rule of capital. This means to struggle for leadership at the micro and macro 
levels simultaneously, to articulate a vision that is consistent from the small, 
everyday acts of solidarity up to an alternative principle of social organisation. 
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